Abstract. We present a code-based public-key cryptosystem, in which we use Reed-Solomon codes over an extension field as secret codes and disguise it by considering its expanded code over the base field. Considering the expanded codes provide a safeguard against distinguisher attacks based on the Schur product. Moreover, without using cyclic or quasi-cyclic structure we obtain a key size reduction of nearly 60% compared to the classic McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Bernstein et al.
Introduction
In 1978 McEliece [31] presented the first code-based public key cryptosystem. It belongs to the family of very few public-key cryptosystems which are unbroken since decades. The hard problem the McEliece system relies on, is the difficulty of decoding a random (-like) linear code having no visible structure. McEliece proposed to use binary Goppa codes for the encryption scheme. Due to the low error-correcting capacity of Goppa codes, the cryptosystem results in large public key sizes. Several alternative families of codes have been proposed with the aim of reducing the key sizes. Some of the famous families of codes considered are: generalised Reed-Solomon codes [5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 25, 36] , non-binary Goppa codes [12] , algebraic geometric codes [24] , LDPC and MDPC codes [7, 34] , Reed-Muller codes [41] and convolutional codes [29] . Most of them were unsuccessful in hiding the structure of the private code [15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 33, 37, 42, 45] .
The motivation to quest for better code-based cryptosystems is mainly due to the advent of quantum computers. In 1994 Peter Shor [40] developed a polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring integers and solving discrete logarithm problems. This means that most of the currently popular cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, will be broken in an era of quantum computers. In the ongoing process of standardization of quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), code-based cryptosystems are one of the most promising candidates. At the time of this writing there are seven code-based cryptosystems included in NIST's standardization process: BIKE [3] based on quasi-cyclic MDPC codes, classic McEliece [11] based on binary Goppa codes, ROLLO [32] based on quasicyclic LRPC codes, RQC [1] based on rank metric quasi-cyclic codes, HQC [1] based on Hamming metric quasi-cyclic codes, LEDAcrypt [4] based on quasicyclic LDPC codes and NTS-KEM [2] based on binary Goppa codes.
In this paper we present a new variant of the McEliece scheme using expanded Reed-Solomon codes. A linear [n, k] code defined over an extension field F q m can be expanded, over the base field F q , to a [mn, mk] linear code by expanding each codeword with respect to a fixed F q -linear isomorphism from F q m to F m q . In the proposed cryptosystem we hide the structure of an expanded GRS code by permuting the columns of its parity check matrix and multiplying by a block diagonal matrix. In order to decode a large number of non-codewords, we use a burst of errors during the encryption step, i.e we consider error vectors having support in sub-vectors of size m/2. This error pattern comes with an disadvantage that it can be used to quicken up the information set decoding attacks. However, for a small degree of extension m the key sizes turn out to be remarkably competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the preliminaries regarding the expanded codes. In Section 3, we describe the proposed cryptosystem which is based on expanded generalised Reed-Solomon codes. In Section 4, we provide security arguments for the proposed cryptosystem against the structural and non-structural attacks. In Section 5, we provide parameters of the proposed cryptosystem that achieve a security level of 256-bits against the ISD attacks.
Background

Expanded Codes
Let q be a prime power and let m be an integer. Let γ be a primitive element of the field F q m , i.e. F q m ∼ = F q (γ). The field F q m can also be seen as an F q -vector space of dimension m via the following F q -linear isomorphism
We extend this isomorphism for vectors over F q m in the following way:
This is clearly an F q -linear isomorphism. Hence this gives us a way to obtain a linear code over F q from a linear code over F q m .
Definition 1 (Expanded Codes). Let n, k be positive integers with k ≤ n, q be a prime power and m be an integer. Let C be a linear code of length n and dimension k over F q m . The expanded code of C with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ F q m is a linear code over the base field F q defined as
where φ n is the F q -linear isomorphism defined by γ as above.
Remark 1.
It is easy to see that the expanded code C is a linear code of length mn and dimension mk, because φ n is an F q -linear isomorphism and
Given a code C with its generator matrix and parity check matrix, the following lemma gives a way to construct a generator matrix and a parity check matrix of the expanded code C.
Then the expanded code of C over F q with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ F q m has the expanded generator matrix
Let C have a parity check matrix H
Then the expanded code of C over F q with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ F q m has the expanded parity check matrix
Proof. See [46, Theorem 1] .
⊺ and a parity check matrix
. Let G and H be the expanded generator matrix and expanded parity check matrix of C, respectively. Then
Remark 2. C can also be determined by the commutativity of the following diagram (as F q -linear maps):
In this section we will present the proposed cryptosystem in the Niederreiter version. First we provide a general framework of the cryptosystem for any given degree of extension m. Then we explicitly provide the case of m = 2 where we receive the lowest key sizes.
General Framework
Key generation: Let q be a prime power, m be an even integer and k < n ≤ q m be positive integers. Consider a GRS code C = GRS n,k (α, β) of dimension k and length n over the finite field F q m and choose a parity check matrix H of C. Let t be the error correction capacity of C. Let H be the expanded parity check matrix of the expanded code of C with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ F q m . H is an m(n − k) × mn matrix over F q . Choose a random m(n−k)×m(n−k) invertible matrix S over F q and 2n random (m/2) × (m/2) invertible matrices T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2n over F q . Define T to be the block diagonal matrix having T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T 2n as diagonal blocks. Now choose a random permutation σ of length 2n and define P σ to be the block permutation matrix of size (mn) × (mn), it can also be seen as Kronecker product of the (2n) × (2n) permutation matrix corresponding to σ and the identity matrix of size m/2. Define Q := T P σ and compute H ′ = S HQ. The private key is then (S, H, Q, γ) and the public key is (H ′ , t).
Encryption: Let y ∈ F mk q be a message having support in t sub-vectors each of length m/2, in particular
for some distinct i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2n}. Then compute the cipher text
Decryption: For the decryption one computes
Now we apply φ
n−k and use Proposition 1 to get
Due to the block structure of the matrix Q, the vector of Qy ⊺ has support in t sub-vectors each of length m/2. Henceforth wt(φ −1 n (Qy ⊺ )) ≤ t, and we can decode φ
. Now by applying φ n and multiplying by Q −1 , we recover our message y.
Case m=2
In the case of m = 2, the cryptosystem simplifies in the following way:
1. In the key generation step, the block diagonal matrix T is now just a nonsingular diagonal matrix. Since we are considering generalised Reed-Solomon codes, we can drop T . Similarly, the block permutation matrix P σ is now just a permutation matrix of size (2n) × (2n). 2. In the encryption step the message y now has support in t sub-vectors each of length m/2 = 1, thus in other words it is a length 2n vector in F q having Hamming weight t.
Key generation: Let q be a prime power and let k < n ≤ q 2 be positive integers. Consider a GRS code C = GRS n,k (α, β) of dimension k and length n over the finite field F q 2 and choose a parity check matrix H of C. Let t be the error correction capacity of C.
Let H be the expanded parity check matrix of the expanded code of C with respect to a primitive element γ ∈ F q 2 . H is a 2(n − k) × (2n) matrix over F q . Choose a random 2(n − k) × 2(n − k) invertible matrix S and a (2n) × (2n) permutation matrix P , both over F q . Then we compute H ′ = S HP . The private key is then (S, H, P, γ) and the public key is (H ′ , t).
Encryption:
Since wt φ
. Now by applying φ n and multiplying by P −1 , we recover our message m.
Security
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed cryptosystem. We focus on the three main attacks on cryptosystems based on GRS codes. Two of them are structural (or key recovery) attacks, namely the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack and the distinguisher attack based on the Schur product of the public code. The third one is the best known non-structural attack called information set decoding (ISD).
Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack
The first code-based cryptosystem using GRS codes as secret codes was proposed by Niederreiter in the same article [36] as the famous Niederreiter cryptosystem. This proposal was then attacked by Sidelnikov and Shestakov in [43] , where they used the fact that the public matrix is still a generator matrix of a GRS code and they could find back the evaluation points and recover the GRS structure of the public matrix.
In the cryptosystem proposed in Section 3, the secret GRS parity check matrix H over F q m is hidden in two ways: first by considering its expanded parity check matrix H over F q and then by scrambling the columns of this matrix. In the case m > 2, due to multiplying H with a block diagonal matrix it is clear that the resulting code is no more equivalent to an evaluation code (or an expanded evaluation code). In case of m = 2 the permutation on the columns of H destroys the correspondence between the expanded evaluation column vectors. Hence evaluations (or expanded evaluation column vectors) can not be exploited using the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack.
Distinguisher attack based on the Schur product
For the attack based on the Schur product we need to introduce some definitions and notations.
Definition 2 (Schur product)
. Let x, y ∈ F n q . We denote by the Schur product of x and y their component-wise product Definition 4 (Schur matrix). Let G be a k × n matrix, with rows (g i ) 1≤i≤k .
The Schur matrix of G, denoted by S(G) consists of the rows
We observe by Remark 3 that if G is a generator matrix of a code C then its Schur matrix S(G) is a generator matrix of the square code of C. Let s be the following map
For a k × n matrix A, we observe that S(A) has the size s(k) × n.
Various McEliece cryptosystems based on modifications of GRS codes have been proved to be insecure [15, 18, 20] . This is because the dimension of the square code of GRS codes is very low compared to a random linear code of the same dimension. Moreover, other families of codes have also been shown to be vulnerable against the attacks based on Schur products. In [16] , Couvreur et al. presented a general attack against cryptosystems based on algebraic geometric codes and their subcodes. In [19] Faugère et al. showed that high rate binary Goppa codes can be distinguished from a random code. In [17] , Couvreur et al. presented a polynomial time attack against cryptosystems based on non-binary Goppa codes defined over quadratic extension.
The distinguisher attack is basically based on the existence of the low dimensional square code of the public code (or of the shortened public code) compared to a random linear code. In the following, based on experimental observations, we infer that the public code of our proposed cryptosystem can be distinguished only when the rate is very high or very low. Let C m be the public code of the proposed cryptosystem in the general framework. Note that C 2 is just the expanded code of a GRS code defined over a quadratic extension. Recall that C m is a linear code of length mn and dimension mk over F q , where k ≤ n ≤ q m .
Experimental Fact 1 If mn ≥ s(mk) = ((mk)
2 + mk)/2, then with high probability the dimension of C m 2 is equal to
Based on these experimental observation, we conclude that if mn ≥ d(m, k) then C m is distinguishable from a random linear code, due to a small discrepancy. In fact, the square code dimension of the Goppa code and C m are both of the order of the dimension squared. We would like to remark that the security of binary Goppa codes against square code attacks is also based on such experimental observations, see [19, Experimental Fact 2].
Information Set Decoding (ISD)
ISD is the best known algorithm for decoding a general linear code. It was introduced by Prange [39] in 1962. Since then several improvements have been proposed for codes over the binary field by Lee-Brickel [27] , Leon [28] , Stern [44] and more recently by Bernstein et al. [13] , Becker et al. [9] , May-Ozerov [30] . Several of these algorithms have been generalized to the case of codes over general finite fields, see [21, 22, 23, 35, 38 ].
An ISD algorithm in its simplest form first chooses an information set I, which is a size k subset of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that the restriction of the parity check matrix on the columns indexed by the complement of I is non-singular. Then Gaussian elimination brings the parity check matrix in a standard form and assuming that the errors are outside of the information set, these row operations on the syndrome will exploit the error vector, if the weight does not exceed the given error correction capacity.
ISD for the proposed cryptosystem in the general framework:
In the general framework of the proposed cryptosystem we introduce a burst pattern in the message (or the error vector), in particular the error vector has support in t sub-vectors each of length m/2. Henceforth, we modify Stern's ISD algorithm to incorporate such pattern in the error vector.
Sterns algorithm divides the information set I into two equal-sized subsets X and Y , and chooses uniformly at random a subset Z of size ℓ outside I. Then it looks for vectors having exactly weight p among the columns indexed by X, exactly weight p among the columns indexed by Y , and exactly weight 0 on columns indexed by Z and the missing weight t − 2p in the remaining indices.
To attack the proposed cryptosystem we have been given a public code C m of length mn and dimension mk over F q . We also know that the error vector has support in t sub-vectors of length m/2. Hence we use Stern's algorithm on the blocks of size m/2. We consider the information set I to have 2k blocks. We divide I into two equal-sized subsets X and Y , and choose uniformly at random a subset Z of 2ℓ blocks outside I. Then we look for vectors having support in exactly p blocks inside X, exactly p blocks inside Y , and exactly 0 blocks in Z. In Section 5 we compute the key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem having 256-bit security against this modified ISD algorithm.
ISD for the proposed cryptosystem with m = 2: In the case of a quadratic extension we do not introduce any pattern in the error vector. Hence we use a standard ISD algorithm to analyze its security. In particular we use the generalized ball-collision algorithm presented in [23] .
Key size
In this section we compute the key sizes of our proposed cryptosystem having 256-bit security against the ISD attack discussed in Section 4.3. Later we compare these key sizes with the key sizes of the McEliece cryptosystems using binary Goppa codes [11] .
Let C m be the public code of the proposed cryptosystem over F q having length mn and dimension mk. The public key is then the systematic form of its parity check matrix, which has size mk · m(n − k) · log 2 (q) bits.
In Table 1 , we provide the key size for different rates of the public code C 2 achieving a 256-bit security level against the generalized ball-collision algorithm presented in [23] . Observe that the smallest key size is achieved at rate 0.75.
In Table 2 , we provide the key size for different rates of the public code C 4 achieving a 256-bit security level against the modified ISD attack discussed in Section 4.3. Again the smallest key size is achieved at rate 0.75.
In conclusion, for a 256 bit security level we propose to use the cryptosystem with the two sets of parameters (q = 31, m = 2, n = 925, k = 693) and (q = 7, m = 4, n = 896, k = 672), see Table 3 .
The proposed parameters for the classic McEliece system using binary Goppa codes by Bernstein et al. in [11] are q = 2, m = 13, n = 6960, k = 5413, which gives a key size of 8373911 bits. It achieves a security level of 260-bits with respect to the ball-collision algorithm. In comparison to the classic McEliece system, the Type I set of parameters reduces the key size by 61.95% and the Type II set of parameters reduces the key size by 19.26%.
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